ABSTRACT The unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) plays an ever increasing and important role in the modern marine environment. In particular, the tasks of underwater reconnaissance and surveillance, underwater mine hunting and anti-submarine warfare, all poses a serious and dangerous threat to humans. UUV has become the forerunning technology to accomplish such missions. In this paper, a method based on dynamic Bayesian network modeling was proposed to evaluate the UUV in an underwater threat situation. We divided the UUV threats into three categories: environmental factors, platform factors, and mission factors. Through each of these categories, we carried out factor extraction and set up the priori probability according to the characteristics. Setting up the static Bayesian network involved the addition of state transition probability and establishment of the model for assessing the dynamic Bayesian threat situation. By comparing the results of the static and dynamic Bayesian simulation, it was shown that the dynamic Bayesian is superior. Moreover, by analyzing the sensitivity, we recognized the greatest current threat and in response, determined the appropriate UUV countermeasures. The results showed that the dynamic Bayesian method has great practical significance and value for threat assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of unmanned underwater technology, the UUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle) has attracted significant and increasing attention from countries all over the world [1] , [2] . Underwater vehicles are confronted with varying and numerous threats while engaged in missions. These include geographical issues, such as ocean currents and complex terrain, engineering and technical problems including actuator and sensor malfunctions, as well as inevitable dynamic threats. Only by correctly assessing the severity, scope and consequences of each threat can they make decisions that lead to a successful course of action. In short, dynamic threat assessment is necessary for unmanned underwater vehicles. With respect to the assessment of dynamic threats in response to an enemy during wartime, or while engaged in scientific research during peacetime, a set of practical methods is of immense value.
Many exploratory studies have been carried out on threat assessment in the country and abroad. The primary theoretical methods are as follows: Grey correlation analysis [3] , [4] , analytic hierarchy process [5] , multi-attribute decision theory [6] , fuzzy logic [7] , [8] , and use of Bayesian networks. Threat assessment technology research has been lagging in China when compared to other countries. According literature, the United States has developed very well performing prototype systems such as TCAC (US Army Analysis System) and BETA (Battlefield Development and Target Acquisition). Similarly, the United Kingdom has developed IKBS (Intelligent Knowledge Base System) for integrating its domestic warship sensors, wireless data chains and signal intelligence. South Africa has also developed a threat assessment system, Future, to assist its navy in detecting threats in the surrounding waters. On the other hand, Canada has developed the TADMUS system using fuzzy logic theory and Bayesian networks. The Portuguese Air Force Development and Innovation Research Center has analyzed scenarios concerning unmanned underwater vehicles [9] under threat, proving that it is feasible to determine the risk probability through Bayesian network learning. Meanwhile, the Russo [10] team at the University of Alsace has used Bayesian networks to assess the threat severity of rear-end collisions. In this research, traffic instances were used to carry out simulation experiments, proving that the results were in line with what had been expected.
In the recent years, research into threat assessment has been on the rise in China. Liu et al. [11] of Harbin Engineering University utilized double Bayesian estimation to assess the motion state of dynamic threats. This method has the potential for more accurate results, leading to an improved outcome. Another study of Liu et al. [12] from the Air Force Engineering University used both a dynamic Bayesian network and a fuzzy neural network to assess the threat level of abnormal air conditions while engaged in air defense operations. Results from the simulation using their GeNIe software are in line with the expectations. Bian and Yang [13] implemented a dynamic Bayesian network to analyze the factors that threaten the formation assumed for air defense. The simulation results showed that the model could effectively identify the categories and the intentions of the subject.
Dynamic Bayesian networks are commonly employed to solve problems in the domain of dynamic threat assessment. A Bayesian network is a framework for knowledge representation and probabilistic reasoning. It has been widely used in cases where the target to be assessed is shrouded by intrinsic uncertainties. Some examples include target threat assessment in battlefields, prediction of transportation conditions, and data mining. Dynamic Bayesian networks have various advantages, including a good dynamic nature and excellent robustness. In Bayesian networks, nodes and arcs represent relationships between elements: nodes represent element incidents and arcs represent probability relationships between elements. Relationships can be either unidirectional or bidirectional, and depend on the domain and the problem being solved. The priori probability loaded into the model can be directly set based on expert knowledge or derived via selflearning using the sample data.
As can be seen from the above research, the majority of effort has been directed towards the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Applications include air defense, air combat, missile targeting and avoidance, as well as other types of assessment using Bayesian networks. However, there has been very little research on threat assessment involving the UUV. In this paper, a method was proposed for threat assessment based on the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN). This accounted myriad threats that were encountered during their missions, including complex sea conditions and other dangers. The study began with the implementation of a static Bayesian network (SBN) model. In order to address the problem of the network's inability to effectively assess a dynamic threat, the state transition probability was added.
Using the personally developed model to evaluate our results, we have carried out simulation-based experiments that effectively mimic typical mission cases.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE BAYESIAN NETWORK A. TYPICAL BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL
The Bayesian network is a graphical model describing the dependencies between random variables, and is widely used to solve problems involving uncertainty. Formally, the Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph with nodes representing random variables and directed arcs between nodes representing conditional dependencies between random variables. It is rooted in probability theory [14] and has the characteristics of two-way reasoning. It can manage both casual reasoning, namely, deduce a posterior probability from a priori probability, and also be competent for diagnostic reasoning. In this case, it will deduce a priori probability from a posterior probability using a formula. Fig.1 shows a typical Bayesian network model for threat assessment, which will be able to determine the causality by setting a priori probability of the threat level with respect to the type and the number of targets. When the new data arrives, it will compute the corresponding prediction and assessment. 
B. DYNAMIC BAYESIAN NETWORK
The ordinary static Bayesian network can accurately analyze and predict data at a specific time; however, it is unable to effectively judge a variable that changes over time. In consideration of variables subject to change with respect to time, the dynamic Bayesian network is introduced. Unlike the static Bayesian network, a dynamic Bayesian network uses techniques that take into account the relationship between moments in time. This relationship is referred to as the state transition probability. In this way, improved results are obtained from the network's ability to learn and make effective use of a change in value between various points in time.
Let the set of the nodes changing over time be X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }, where X i [t] shows the state value of the i variable at time t. The DBN can be defined as:
where B 0 represents the initial BN, with the probability distribution P(X [0]), for the initial state X [0]. B τ indicates the transfer network, with the transition probability specified as
) for the variable state change from time t to time t + 1. Take note that the state probability at time t + 1, is related to time t, and no other point in time. We make the assumption that the conditional probability of adjacent time is stationary in a finite time range; that P(
Based on this assumption, there are two parts in a dynamic Bayesian network for joint probability distribution established on the time axis of the random process:
(1) A priori network B 0 shown in Figure 2 (a), as the probability distribution for the initial state;
(2) A transfer network B τ shown in Figure 2 (b), as the transition probability between the two moments. In summary, for a given dynamic Bayesian network model
, the formula for the joint distribution probability is:
where
) represents the joint distribution of the nodes in the network,P B 0 (X [1] ) is the probability distribution of the node at time t, and P B τ (X [t + 1]X [t]) represents the state transition probability.
C. DYNAMIC BAYESIAN EVALUATION INFERENCE MECHANISM
The essence of DBN reasoning is the probability calculation based on the established model, with the Bayesian formula and independence hypothesis adopted as its basis, as follows:
where P(X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) is the joint distribution of all nodes in the established evaluation model, and P a (X i ) is the set of parent nodes for X i . For the static Bayesian network model, assuming that the network has n hidden nodes and m observation nodes, the following inference mechanism can be obtained by combining the above formulas and assumptions:
where i in the formula can be valued from 1 to n, and j from 1 to m, x i represents the value of the X i , y j represents the value of the observation variable Y j , P a (x i ) and P a (y j ) respectively indicate the set of the parent nodes for x i and y j .
The formula (4) shows the reasoning mechanism for the static Bayesian network. If it is extended along the timeline to be a dynamic network to include T time points, then the reasoning mechanism for the dynamic Bayesian network can be obtained. When the observation values have only one composite state, the hidden variables will be distributed as in (5), shown at the bottom of this page, where, i = 1, 2, . . . , T ; j = 1, 2, . . . , m; k = 1, 2, . . . , n; x ij represents a value state of the X ij . The first subscript represents the i time point, while the second subscript represents the j hidden node within this time point. y ij represents the value of the observation variable Y ij . P a (y ij ) represents the set of the parent nodes for y ij . If the observation value is in multiple states, then the following will hold as (6) , shown at the bottom of this page, where, i = 1, 2, . . . , T ; j = 1, 2, . . . , m; k = 1, 2, . . . , n; y ijs indicates the state of the j observation node x ij , within the i time slice. P(y ij = y ijs ) is the probability of y ij in the corresponding state. In its entirety, this describes the inference mechanism of the dynamic Bayesian network.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL FOR UUV THREAT SITUATION ASSESSMENT A. STEPS FOR UUV THREAT ASSESSMENT BASED ON BAYESTAN NETWORK
When using the Bayesian network to evaluate the UUV threat situation, the first task is to consider the types of threats that might be encountered. Following this, the threat factors must be extracted and the state parameters for these must be determined. Specifically, the system must pinpoint which P(x 11 , x 12 , . . . , x 1n , . . . , x T 1 , x T 2 , . . . , x Tn |y 11 , y 12 , . . . , y 1n , . . . , y T 1 , y T 2 , . . . , y Tn ) monitoring variables can be used to predict whether certain factors pose a threat. Once this is complete, the Bayesian network must be configured in such a way that the relationship between nodes is determined through expert knowledge. Essentially, this constitutes the reasoning mechanism of the network.
B. EXTRACTION OF UUV THREAT FACTORS
UUVs will face a variety of threats underwater; hence, to assess each situation, the first step is to extract and refine the observable threat factors and build the nodes of the threat assessment model. As there are copious threat factors, we divided them into three categories: environmental factors, platform factors and mission factors. Table 1 shows the set of threat factors and their states. The data in the above table can be used to establish a static Bayesian overall model for UUV threat assessment, as shown in Fig.3 . In addition, it can be used with static Bayesian models for the three types of threat factors shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6 . Based on the characteristics of the three types of threat factors and the actual situation, the state set is determined. Once this is done, the priori probability is set according to expert's experience. As there is an immense volume of data for priori probability, we only show the priori probability for environmental factors, as shown in Tables 2, 3 It is important to recognize that when the UUV is engaged in an actual mission, it will be faced with more complex conditions that are often related to time. For example, with respect to the threat of enemy submarines, this is a case where consideration of the former and latter moments affects the accuracy of the prediction. Only by summarizing the state changes along the time line can we reason the correct results in a relatively accurate manner. Facing this type of dynamic threat, the static Bayesian network performs poorly, and therefore cannot be relied upon. As such, it is necessary to use a dynamic Bayesian network for threat situation assessment. The dynamic Bayesian network has all of the advantages of a static network, but is also able to follow changes over time in order to make more realistic predictions and follow superior actions.
Based on the analysis of the environmental threat factors, those with dynamic characteristics are the distance and orientation of underwater obstacles. As the obstacles do not have a time attribute associated with themit, a time platform is inserted into the software to account for this data. The priori probability can be set according to the expert's experience or alternatively learned from the existing data files. Under normal circumstances, the parameters of model learning will be much closer to reality. However, learning from massive volumes of data takes considerably takes more time. This model uses expert knowledge to set the parameters directly. See Fig.7 for the dynamic Bayesian model used to assess environmental threats. Considering that the former and latter moments are related when underwater obstacles are dynamic targets, this relationship can be represented by a special arc. Both start and end nodes are the same, and this represents the probability relationship between the former and latter moments. In this case, the partial priori probability for the underwater VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 5. Partial priori probability for the underwater obstacle is set at time t. TABLE 6. Partial priori probability for the underwater obstacle is set at time t +1.
obstacle is set at time t and time t+1 respectively, as shown in Table 5 and Table 6 .
Based on the analysis of the platform-related threat factors, those with dynamic characteristics include enemy submarines and mines. The threat of water leakage does not have the time attribute, so a time platform is inserted into the software in order to add the time factor related to enemy submarines and mine threats. Moreover, the threat of an enemy submarine is strongly uncertain and very threatening. As the submarines are maneuvered artificially, we need to consider different threat modes for them. This model has proposed two modes: chasing and surpassing. According to their characteristics, the a priori probability needs to be set with consideration of time factors. This model still uses expert knowledge to set parameters directly. See Fig.8 for the dynamic Bayesian model used to assess the platform-related threats.
As in the case of underwater obstacles, the former and latter moments are related when enemy mines and submarine threats are dynamic targets. In this case, an arc with the one node representing both start and end is added to represent the impact of the former moment on the latter moment. The priori probability is set for enemy mines at time t and t + 1, respectively, as shown in Table 7 and Table 8 . Due to the large volume of data for other priori probabilities, they are not listed extensively in this paper.
Based on the analysis of mission-related threat factors, this kind of network does not contain any dynamic threats. Consequently, the dynamic model is consistent with the static Bayesian model for threat assessment. 
TABLE 7.
Priori probability is set for enemy mines at time t.
IV. SIMULATION OF TYPICAL CASES FOR UUV ISR MISSIONS A. CASE DESIGN FOR ISR MISSION SIMULATION
Generally, UUVs will act as the backbone for supporting fleet missions in the future. Whether in wartime or peacetime, it is of critical significance to classify typical mission situations. According to the U.S. Navy's UUV Overall Plan 2004, the primary missions of UUVs are divided into nine categories [15] , of which ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) is one of the nine typical missions. The Navy unequivocally needs continuous ISR, whose reconnaissance data includes all types of intelligence gathering, target detection and localization, and mapping. UUVs can operate over long distances, in shallow waters and autonomously. In addition, they are better suited for concealment than any other system. In summary, UUVs are ideal for information gathering.
Based on the analysis of the above-mentioned ISR missions, it is assumed that we have an UUV performing its task of surveying the seabed terrain, which is 3-5 nautical miles away from the host platform. The job involves collecting data and feeding it back to the host platform for intelligence imaging. Also, this UUV has been working underwater continuously for 10 hours; the motor power reports 40% as displayed, and the ocean current is comparatively weak and moderate in density. The mission load is being reported as abnormal from time t = 4; a static and separate obstacle is found 100m ahead, and its passive sonar has detected enemy submarines slowly moving 13km to the side.
According to the above case, we can handle the threat factors, assuming that everything is in good condition before time t = 4. At this time, SJL = {50-130}; SSL = {single}; SFW = {steady }; DLD = {lack }; RWZH = {bad }; QT = {dangerous}. The rest of the factors are in good condition while the environmental, platform-related and missionbased factors need to be used for comprehensive assessment of the threat. Tables 9, 10 and 11 will present the input evidence of the three types of network.
B. ANALYSIS OF BAYESIAN SIMULATION RESULTS FOR ISR MISSIONS
The results are as follows for simulation of the cases stated in the previous section by using the established static and dynamic Bayesian network assessment models. Fig.9-Fig.14 show the simulation results. From these the results of environmental and platform-related dynamic and as well as static threats, it can be seen that the dynamic network has a higher sensitivity to the presence of threats. It is successfully able to considers the changes over time and the tendency for events to develop. With the enhanced knowledge of the relationship between the previous and latter moments, the network is more capable of determining danger.
Consequently, the danger value is often higher in the threat assessment results for the dynamic network. See Fig.15 for the histogram of the sensitivity analysis. Fig.15 gives a quantitative ranking of the threat levels, showing that the most threatening to the mission is the enemy submarine (QT), followed by the underwater obstacles (SZAW) and energy margin (NYYL). When these conditions are relayed back to the control center, the UUV will take action that is prioritized accordingly. It will first deal with and evade the enemy submarine threat, optimally by returning to the host platform where it will replenish energy while monitoring the enemy submarine. At this point, the platform will determine the next action or strategy.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With the general notion that China has been increasingly focusing on ocean engineering and ocean research, wherein the development of underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV) has attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, we have studied methods for the assessment of UUV threat situations by adopting the techniques of static and dynamic Bayesian network modeling. We have simulated various threat assessments on both network types, with the results showing that the dynamic Bayesian method has more practical significance and inherent value. Finally, we have designed a relevant simulation case that is based on typical ISR missions, in accordance with UUV-specific missions. Our system was successful in the simulation and has proved the feasibility of the dynamic Bayesian method for the assessment of UUV threats. It should be pointed out that the priori probability of our dynamic Bayesian threat assessment model is set based on expert knowledge in this field. Inevitably, this is subjective and limited by the experience of the expert. Reasonable and scientific determination of priori probability in this model to enhance its objectivity and reliability shall be the focus of future work. Additionally, the dynamic Bayesian network method can be applied in business risk assessment and diagnostics. YIMING LI received the B.S. degree in automation from Harbin Engineering University, China, in 2018. He is currently pursuing the M.S. degree with Shandong University. His research interests include autonomy control and swarm intelligence for unmanned systems, intelligent optimization theory and methods, machine learning, deep learning, deep reinforcement learning, and target tracking. 
